Further, NRI Legal Services it has been argued that the word levied under Rule 20(2)(a), in the NRI Legal Services context includes even collection and this being so, whatever has not been collected in the interregnum period obviously cannot be collected retrospectively. It was further argued that the levy of anti-dumping duty is not automatic and is only levied by the Central Government NRI Legal Services taking into account a series of complex economic factors. The Magistrate has NRI Legal Services improperly exercised his discretion within the meaning of the aforesaid observations of this Court and therefore, the High Court was certainly within its right to enhance the sentence.
Isaacs has taken us through the evidence of Amritlal Bannerjee, Mustafi and Paul; but we have not been able to see any statement made by any of these witnesses which would show that there was a competition between the two sets of goods. 4 of the Agreement NRI Legal Services and a NRI Legal Services reading of the Central Governments own website which was referred to us in the course of arguments stating that the anti-dumping rules are in consonance with the WTO Agreements on anti-dumping.
In this context, it was further argued that no duty can be levied in the interregnum period as the Government would then be doing indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly ” namely, extending the period of six months of the levy of provisional duty beyond six months and until the notification imposing the final anti-dumping duty. He, inter alia, recorded the following findings in his order: The aforementioned contention of the assessee was brushed aside by the Commissioner in his Order-in-Original dated December 10, 2003, thereby confirming the excise duty demand as mentioned in the show-cause notice.
But apart from this technical difficulty, the appellant cannot even refer to any evidence on which it would be possible to base a conclusion as to the competition between the goods produced by the Kanpur mills and the appellant’s goods. It was further argued that Rule 20(2)(a) has to be harmoniously construed with both Rules 13 and 21, or else, the suggested construction by revenue of Rule 20(2)(a) would render Rules 13 and 21 nugatory. It was also argued that, on a true construction of Rule 20(2)(a), the said rule merely validates a provisional duty already levied, and nothing beyond.
22,64,176 be not confirmed under the provisions of Section 11A(1) of the Act and why redemption fine in lieu of confiscation as well as penalty be not imposed. and (f)that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the 38 298 law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.
That presumably is the reason why the appellant could not allege any competition between its goods and the goods of the Kanpur mills and none of the witnesses could speak to it. Though the High Court has power on a review of the evidence to reverse the order of acquittal, yet in doing so it should not only consider all matters on record including the reasons given by the Trial Court in respect of the order of acquittal, but should particularly consider those aspects which are in favour of the accused and ought not also to act on conjunctions or surmises nor on inferences which do not arise on the evidence in the case.
On the other hand, such meagre evidence as is available on the record would seem to suggest that the goods produced by the Kanpur mills are sent to local markets for domestic consumption and do not enter the field of competition with the appellant’s goods at all. Show-cause notice dated March 21, 2002 was issued proposing confiscation of the goods and since these goods had already been provisionally released on payment of full excise duty as leviable on the goods under Chapter sub- heading 3306.
It may be mentioned that he was returned as a Congress candidate but has since been expelled from that party for having contested the last general election as an independent candidate against the Congress candidate. Section 9A(2) and (6), in contrast, do not allow any imposition, retrospectively, of anti-dumping duty, and therefore if Rule 20 were to be read in the manner suggested by revenue, it would be ultra vires the parent statute. On a consideration of the evidence, we think that the reversal of the order of acquittal by the High Court was not warranted.
It was also argued before us that Section 9A(3) alone empowers the rule making authority to impose a retrospective anti-dumping duty within the strict confines of the said rule. It has been argued with some vehemence that this also follows from a reading of clause 18. 10, show-cause notice stated as to why the amount of differential duty amounting to ? The assessee filed its reply thereto contending that it was not a toothpaste and, therefore, rightly classified by it under sub-heading 3306.
This being so, the continuity of such levy can only be for the period indicated in the provisional duty levy notification and not beyond.